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was murder of the first degree, and we cannot say that there
was any abuse of discretion in imposing the death penalty.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 189, 190, 1026.)
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September
25, 1952.
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JAMES F. THO¥AS, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA
EMPI..JOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION et
al., Appellants.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board is
a statutory agency with statewide jurisdiction and has no
constitutional authority to make final determinations of fact,
and any person deprived of a property right by such an
administrative body is entitled to a limited trial de novo in
the superior court.
[2] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-Unemployment benefits provided for by the Unemployment Insurance
Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d) are property rights
within the rule that persons deprived of property rights by
a statutory administrative agency are entitled to a limited
trial de novo in the superior court.
[3] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Authority of Commission.When a claimant has met all requirements of the Unemployment Insurance Act, and all contingencies have taken place
under its terms, he then has a statutory right to a fixed or
definitely ascertainable sum of money, the exact determination
. of which is essentially a mathematical and mechanical process,
and the administrative authorities have no discretion to withhold benefits from him once it is determined that the facts
. support his claim and the condition of the fund permits
payment.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 176,
233.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Unemployment Insurance, § 34;
[3] Unemployment Insurance, § 21; [5, 6] Unemployment Insurance,§ 35.
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[4] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a mandamus proceeding in the superior court to compel payment
of unemployment benefits denied by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, the court may properly exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.
[5] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a mandamus proceeding to compel payment of unemployment benefits denied by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to
employees of a company's sawmill who refused to go through
a picket line set up by the logging employees of the company,
a finding that claimants were discharged as of a certain date
is sustained by evidence that, after the plant was closed, each
of the claimants received a notice from the company entitled
"employment termination," which was signed by the company's
foreman and stated that the "date terminated" was that particular date, since their mere refusal to cross the picket line
-did not terminate the employer-employee relationship.
[6] !d.-Administrative Procedure-Judicial Review.-In a mandamus proceeding to compel payment of unemployment bene_fits to employees of a company's sawmill who refused to go
-through a picket line set up by the logging employees of the
Slompany, a determination of the trial court that the discharge
of claimants by the company as of a certain date was the
_direct and proximate cause of each claimant being unemployed
after that date is not sustained in the absence of evidence
indicating that the notices terminating employment caused
claimants to remain out of work after that date or had
anything to do with their determination to remain away from
their jobs, and where evidence that they failed to respond
to subsequent notices given by the company to all employees
requesting that they return to work immediately or as soon
as strike conditions cease to exist show that they were out of
work because of a trade dispute and thus disqualified from
receiving benefits under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. W. T. Belieu, Judge.*
Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel payment of unemployment benefits. Judgment granting writ reversed.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, Irving H. Perluss, William L. Shaw and Chas. W. Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellants California
Employment Stabilization Commission et al.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Marshall P. Madison, Francis
N. Marshall and Frederick H. Hawki.ns for Appellant Pacific
Lumber Company.
Todd & Todd, Clarence E. Todd, Henry C. Todd, George E.
Flood and Gordon W. Mallatratt for Respondent.
GIBSON, 0. J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment which
granted a writ of mandate ordering benefits to be paid to
plaintiff and 190 other employees of defendant Pacific Lumber Company under the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats.
1935, p. 1226, as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws [1937],
Act 8780d; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws [1944], Act 8780d.) The
judgment set aside a decision of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board which denied such benefits
to the claimants.
The logging employees of the company struck and set up
a picket line around the company's sawmill. Claimants, who
were plant or mill employees, refused to go through the
picket line. The company closed the plant and gave claimants notices of "employment termination." The appeals
board determined that claimants were out of work because
of a trade dispute and therefore were disqualified by section 56 of the act from receiving unemployment benefits.*
This proceeding for a writ of mandate was then instituted
in the superior court, and the matter was presented on the
record before the board. The court, after holding that it
was entitled to exercise independent judgment on the evidence, found that claimants had been discharged and concluded, in effect, that this removed their disqualification. It
annulled the decision of the board and granted a writ of
mandate directing the commission to pay benefits accruing
after the date of discharge.
Defendants contend that the trial court was without power
to reweigh the evidence and that, in any event, the judgment
must be reversed because the undisputed facts show as a
matter of law that claimants are disqualified under section
56 of the Unemployment Insurance .Act.
*Section 56, as amended in 1945 (Stats. 1945, p. 2225), provides: "An
individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment, and no such
benefit shall be payable to him under any of the following conditions:
(a) If he left his work because of a trade dispute and for the period
during which he continues out of work by reason of the fact that the
trade dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which
he was employed."
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[1] The appeals board is a statutory agency with statewide jurisdiction, and it does not have constitutional authority
to make final determinations of fact. (For general statutory provisions see Unemp. Ins. Act, Deering's Gen. Laws
[1944], .Act 8780d, §§ 1, 77, et seq.) .Any person deprived
of a property right by such an administrative body is entitled to a limited trial de novo in the superior court. (Laisne
v. State Board of Optornetry, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457] ;
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301 [196
P.2d 20] ; Dare v. Board of JJ!edical Exarniners, 21 Cal.2d
790 [136 P.2d 304] .) [2] In our opinion the benefits provided for by the Unemployment Insurance .Act are property
rights within the meaning of the term as used in the cases
requiring a trial de novo. [3] When a claimant has met
all requirements of the act, and all contingencies have taken
place under its terms, he then has a statutory right to a
fixed or definitely ascertainable sum of money. (See, for
example, §§ 54, 67 [now in 68], and 72 as amended in 1945,
Stats. 1945, pp. 1108, 2558, 2559-2560.) The determination
of the exact amounts due is essentially a mathematical and
mechanical process, and the administrative authorities have
no discretion to withhold benefits from any particular claimant once it is determined that the facts support his claim
and the condition of the fund permits payment. Benefit
claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for
business and professional licenses such as those considered
in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [91 P.2d
1035], and Southern Cal. Jockey Olttb v. California Racing
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [223 P.2d 1], where we held
that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property
rights. There, as the court pointed out, the administrative
officers were given broad discretionary powers to deny applications, subject to review only for disregard of the law,
arbitrary action, or other abuse of discretion. [ 4] We conclude, therefore, that in the present case the trial court acted
correctly in exercising its independent judgment on the
evidence.
[5] The next question is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the determination of the trial court that
the claimants are entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits. They refused to cross the picket line which
was set up by the logging workers on January 14, 1946,
and the company closed its plant on January 18 because
of the absence of certain unidentified "key men" neces-
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sary to the operation of the mill. Some of the claimants
participated in the picket line both before and after the
plant was closed. It is undisputed that claimants' refusal
to cross the picket line resulted in their being out of work
because of a trade dispute, within the meaning of section 56
of the act, s1rpra, ( Stats. 1945, p. 2225), from January 14
to and including January 17, and, therefore, that they were
disqualified from receiving benefits for this period. (See
Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d
695 [151 P.2d 202], and companion cases.)
After the plant was closed each of the claimants received
from the company a notice entitled "employment termination," which was signed by the company's foreman and
stated that the ''date terminated'' was January 18, 1946.
The trial court found and concluded that these notices were
used by the company for the purpose of discharging claimants, that the company terminated and discharged each claimant on January 18, 1946, and that the discharge was the
direct and proximate cause of unemployment after that date.
The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's :finding that claimants were discharged as of January 18. They
were employees of the company until that date, since their
refusal to cross the picket line did not terminate the employeremployee relationship. (See Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California
Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154
A.IJ.R. 1081].) The "employment termination" notices were
unqualified and indicated that there was a discharge as of
the designated date, and there is other evidence, which need
not be set forth here, that tends to support the :finding.
Testimony, relied upon by defendants, that the company
did not intend to discharge claimants but only to terminate
their "continuous employment period" for purposes of the
company's bonus plan merely presented a conflict in the
evidence which was resolved in favor of claimants.
[6] A more difficult question is presented as to whether
there is any substantial evidence which supports the determination of the trial court that the discharge of claimants
by the company was the direct and proximate cause of each
claimant being unemployed after January 18, 1946. There
appears to be no conflict in the evidence with respect to the
events which transpired insofar as this phase of the case
is concerned. Claimants refused to pass the picket line which
the logging employees established around the company's sawmill, and, as we have seen, it is undisputed that this refusal
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operated to disqualify claimants from receiving benefits for
the period of their unemployment prior to January 18. The
picket line, as well as the trade dispute between the logging
employees and the company, continued after that date and
during the entire period for which claimants seek benefits.
Four of the six claimants who testified in the administrative
proceeding admitted that they participated in the picket
line after they were discharged.
There is no evidence in the record indicating that the
termination notices caused claimants to remain out of work
after January 18 or had anything to do with their determination to remain away from their jobs. None of the
claimants who appeared as witnesses testified that he would
have returned to work if he had not been discharged or that
he would have been willing to cross the picket line. To the
contrary, claimants did not respond to two notices given by
the company to all employees on or about January 21 and
February 18 requesting that they return to work immediately
or as soon as strike conditions cease to exist.
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this
case the only reasonable conclusion is that claimants remained out of work after January 18 as well as before that
date because they were unwilling to cross the picket line·
which was maintained by the logging employees in their
trade ·dispute with the company. .Accordingly, claimants
were disqualified under section 56 of the act from receiving
unemployment insurance benefits.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment.
It is undisputed that claimants left their work because
of a trade dispute within the meaning of section 56(a) of
the Unemployment Insurance .Act. (See Matson Terminals,
Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151
P.2d 202]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17
Cal.2d 321, 328 [109 P.2d 935] .) The only question presented, therefore, is whether or not they remained out of
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute was still
in active progress in the establishment in which they were
employed. For the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion
in Southern California Jockey Club v. California Racing
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 178 [223 P.2d 1], and the dissenting
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opinions cited therein, it is my opinion that claimants were
not entitled to a limited trial de novo on this issue; whether
or not the right to unemployment insurance benefits is a
property right. Accordingly, the only issue properly before
the trial court and now before this court is whether the
findings of the appeals board are supported by substantial
evidence.
In Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d
744 [151 P.2d 229, 154 A.L.R. 1081], this court said regarding the tests for determining the duration of the disqualification under section 56 (a), when the original unemployment had been superseded by new employment: ''A claimant is thus ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a claimant
who leaves his work because of a trade dispute subsequently
obtains a permanent full-time job, however, he is no longer
out of work and the continuity of his unemployment is broken.
If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated to the dispute,
he is unemployed by reason, not of the trade dispute, but
of the loss of the new employment [citations]. The trade
dispute that caused him to leave his original employment is
not the cause of his subsequent unemployment, and he would
no more be disqualified from receiving benefits for such unemployment than if he had not been previously employed
in the struck establishment.
''The termination of a claimant's disqualification by subsequent employment thus depends on whether it breaks the
continuity of the claimant's unemployment and the causal
connection between his unemployment and the trade dispute."
In the present case the appeals board was of the opinion
that an unequivocal discharge would also break the causal
connection between the unemployment and the trade dispute. It found, however, that by issuing the employment
termination notices the employer did not unequivocally terminate the employment relationship.
There is evidence that the employer customarily used the
employment termination notices not only when an employee
resigned or was discharged, but for the purpose of terminating an employee's continuous service record under the "Continuous Service Compensation Plan" when he was absent
without leave for more than three days. Accordingly, the
purpose for which the notices were used in the present case
cannot be determined from their provisions alone.
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During the period the employer issued the termination
notices it also sent to all employees and former employees
the following notice :
''All Employees and former Employees not working because of the strike or strike conditions are requested and
urged to return to work immediately or as soon as such
conditions cease to exist.
''Failure to comply with this request may result in other
persons being employed in your place."
It may reasonably be inferred that the employer was not
discharging employees it was urging to return to work, and
that the termination notices were therefore neither intended
to sever nor understood by claimants as severing the employeremployee relationship. Moreover, the notice urging the employees to return to work itself indicated that they would retain their status until other persons were employed in their
place.
Since the determination of the appeals board was supported by substantial evidence, I concur in the reversal of
the judgment.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that
the claimants were out of work because of a discharge by
the employer rather than a trade dispute.
After January 17, 1946, is the crucial period, for the employer closed the plant. After the plant was closed each
of the claimants received from the company a notice which
was in form as follows:
"THE PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY
FORM 2105
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
The employee must present this slip to the Employment
Office at Scotia within two days from date of issue.
No. ___ B _ _ __
Employee
Working
Occupation,__________
Rate
Date Last Worked
No. hour"---Date T e r m i n a t e · " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Signe;u__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Note•U---------Foreman
Timekeeper
Employee's Signature_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
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The forms, signed by the company's foreman, were appropriately filled out with respect to each claimant, the
"date terminated" being stated as January 18, 1946. The
trial court found and concluded that the claimants were
given the termination notices because they refused to go
through the picket line; that the notices were used in this
case for the purpose of terminating claimants' employment
and amounted to an unequivocal discharge; and that this
discharge interposed a new intervening cause for claimants'
unemployment, relieving them after January 18, 1946, from
any disqualification imposed by section 56 of the Unemployment Insurance Act.
It is conceded that the evidence is sufficient to support the
trial court's finding that claimants were unequivocally discharged as of January 18th, and that they were employees
of the company until that date, since their refusal to cross
the picket line did not terminate the employer-employee relationship. (See Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com.,
24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154 .A..L.R. 1081] .)
This is clear for the "employment termination" notices were
unqualified and plainly indicated that there was a discharge
as of the designated date. One claimant who refused to
cross the picket line was told by his immediate supervisor
that he was ''through,'' that after the strike was over he
would have no job, and that the supervisor would see to
it that the claimant would not receive "compensation."
Claimants were given their 1946 federal withholding tax
statements, which, under the Internal Revenue Code, need
not have been furnished until termination of employment
or until January 31st of the succeeding year. (26 U.S.C ..A..
§ 1625 [a].) Defendants rely on testimony that the company did not intend to discharg·e claimants but only to terminate their ''continuous employment period'' for purposes
of the company's bonus plan. .A.s the court found, however,
no such limited purpose was indicated on any of the notices,
and the testimony merely presented a conflict in the evidence
which was resolved in favor of claimants.
The majority opinion holds, however, that the discharge
was not the proximate cause of the unemployment after
January 18th, contrary to the trial court's finding. With
that I disagree. The record supports the determination of
the trial court that the discharge of claimants on January
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18, 1946, interposed a new, intervening cause for their unemployment. The fact that claimants were unemployed because of a trade dispute from January 14th through January
17th did not preclude them from becoming entitled to benefits after that date if continuation of their unemployment
was due to factors other than their participation in the trade
dispute. The disqualification exists only during the period
in which the dispute remains the cause of the unemployment. (Section 56 of the act; see Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Corn., 24 Cal.2d 744, 748-750 [151 P.2d 229,
154 A.L.R. 1081] .)
'l'he company's act of discharging claimants completely
changed the nature of their unemployment, insofar as their
status under section 56 is concerned. Disqualification under
this statute depends upon the fact of voluntary action by
the worker. (See Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Emp.
Corn., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151 P.2d 202] ; Bodinson Mfg.
Co. v. California Ernp. Corn., 17 Cal.2d 321, 327-328 [109
P.2d 935] ; see, also, McKinley v. California Emp. Stab. Com.,
34 Cal.2d 239, 242-245, 252 [209 P.2d 602].) An employee
who observes a picket line is disqualified on the theory that
he has a free ''choice'' in determining whether to work in
a plant in which certain of his fellow employees are on strike,
and that his decision not to work is voluntary. (Bodinson
Mfg. Co. v. California Ernp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 327-328
[109 P.2d 935] ; Matson Terminals Inc. v. California Ernp.
Com., 24 Cal.2d 695, 702-704 [151 P.2d 202] .) He nevertheless remains an employee, regardless of the strike and picketing (see Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Com.,
24 Cal.2d 744, 749, 751 [151 P.2d 229, 154 A.L.R. 1081] ),
and he can return to work at any time he becomes willing
to do so. Where, as here, however, the employer discharges
some of its employees, such persons no longer have the choice
of returning to their jobs, and it cannot be said that their
subsequent unemployment is due to their voluntarily continuing out of work because of a picket line. Unlike persons who remain employees, they have no reasonable expectation of going back to work upon termination of the trade
dispute, and if they do obtain work with the same employer,
they will have to be rehired and will come in as new employees. It thus seems apparent that section 56 ceases to
operate with respect to workers whose employment relationship has been wholly severed, and it can have no bearing on
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their right to benefits until they are reemployed, upon mutual
agreement.
Defendants contend that two notices given by the company show that claimants voluntarily remained away from
their jobs because of the trade dispute. One notice, dated
January 21, 1946, requested "all Employees and former Employees not working because of the strike" to return to work
immediately or as soon as strike conditions ceased to exist.
stated that "you are still employees of the Company" and
repeated the request to return to work. These requests, howThe second notice, given about a month after the discharge,
ever, did not alter the fact that claimants were discharged
nor did they serve to restore the employment relationship,
and, as we have seen, if anyone had returned to work in
response to the requests, he would have done so as a new
employee.
Unlike the situation presented in McKinley v. California
Emp. Com., 34 Cal.2d 239 [209 P.2d 602), relied upon by
defendants, the record does not establish that claimants engaged in any conduct which they knew would cause the company to retaliate by preventing their return to work. The
court impliedly found, and the finding is based upon substantial evidence, that claimants did not know that refusal
to cross the picket line would result in their discharge. Such
conduct ordinarily suspends but does not terminate the employment relationship, and the company gave no warning
that claimants would be discharged. The company had
adopted a rule which provided that an employee who was
absent for over three days without permission "shall be
dropped from the Company's payroll and employment period
terminated,'' but the rule was contained in a printed booklet entitled "Continuous Service Compensation Plan" and
may reasonably be interpreted as pertaining only to that
plan.
Further, it does not appear that claimants' conduct caused
the plant to be closed on January 18, 1946, or to remain
closed thereafter. The record supports the :finding that the
plant was closed by the absence of certain key men necessary
to the operation of said mill, but does not establish that
claimants were the key men. Even if we assume that the
strike caused the absence of the key men, claimants were
not members of the same local union to which the strikers
belonged, and there is nothing to show that claimants voted
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for or authorized the strike or that the key men were absent
because some of the claimants participated in the picketing.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
25, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[S. 1!,. No. 18590.
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LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner,
v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and
GLENN W. DAHLER, a Minor, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to
Employment.-In determining whether a particul'ar act is
reasonably contemplated by the employment so that injuries
received while performing it may be compensable, the nature
of the employment, the custom and usage of a particular
employment, the terms of the contract of employment, and
other factors should be considered, and any reasonable doubt
as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in
view of the policy of liberal construction in favor of the
employee, should be resolved in his favor.
[2a, 2b] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-A
college student employed by operator of store and restaurant
at a summer resort as a dishwasher and a helper is not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained while diving and
swimming for his own pleasure in a stream off his employer's
property, although on the resort premises, since in the absence of evidence that, at the time of such student's hiring,
anything was said about his participation in any available
recreational activities or even mention made of the stream,
it cannot be said that the injuries were sustained in the
course of or incidental to his employment, or that they were
proximately caused by the employment.
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-To entitle an injured employee to compensation there must be some
connection between the injury and the employment other
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 83.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 72;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 73, 74; [3] Workmen's Compensation, § 71; [ 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 73.

